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Abstract
Did the rise in anti-American sentiment caused by the Iraq war aect sales of US goods
abroad? We address this question using data on sales of soft drinks and fabric detergents in
nine Arab countries. We nd a statistically signicant but modest and short-lived negative
impact of the war on sales of US soft drinks in some countries but no impact on the sales
of detergents in any country. Variation in aggregate market shares of US products across
countries correlates with consumer attitudes toward the US in the soft drink market but not
in the detergent market.
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The US-led war in Iraq dominated the international political scene from the fall of 2002 to the
summer of 2003 and remained in the headlines for several years thereafter. The acrimonious
debate over the war's military, legal and ethical justication led to a straining of relations
between erstwhile close allies, particularly the United States and France. French objections
over the necessity of war led to a rise in anti-French sentiment in the United States. American
displeasure toward the French manifested itself in a variety of ways, perhaps most famously in
the renaming of french fries as \freedom fries". Less emblematic but potentially more harmful
reactions included campaigns calling for boycotts of French products. The eectiveness of these
campaigns has been a subject of debate in recent economic research, with one study reporting
an estimated drop of 10-12% in bilateral trade between the US and France.1
Most directly however, the Iraq war raised anti-US sentiment in many parts of the world,
particularly among Arabs. Surveys conducted in six Arab countries (Morocco, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Lebanon, UAE, Egypt) show that the percentage of Arabs who had an unfavorable
opinion of the US increased from 74 to 84 percent between March 2002 and June 2004 (?).
This average masks considerable variation across countries with a staggering 98% of Egyptians
reporting an unfavorable opinion of the US in 2004, up from 76% in 2002. In contrast, citizens
of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) show an improved view of the US over this period (from
87% unfavorable in 2002 to 73% in 2004). When respondents in the survey are asked to name
the principal factors determining their attitudes towards the US, they overwhelmingly cite the
Iraq war and US policy towards the Palestinians.
In this paper we measure the extent to which the rise of anti-US sentiment due to the
invasion of Iraq aected the sales of US goods in Arab countries. Boycott campaigns against
US products are reported to have been organized in many Arab countries during this period.
The campaigns typically targeted iconic American brands such as McDonald's and Coca-Cola
but also extended to products that are less symbolic of America, such as cleaning supplies and
electronics. Our study focuses on two product categories, soft drinks and laundry detergents.
The soft drink category was chosen as the primary focus of our analysis because it includes
Coca-Cola and Pepsi, agship American brands that may be most vulnerable to a boycott
campaign relying on anti-American sentiment. In the laundry detergent category the major US
producer is Procter & Gamble (P&G), with Colgate having a smaller presence. These companies
are probably less high prole as US producers than Coca-Cola or Pepsi. Studying detergents is
nonetheless instructive because US producers in this industry face competition from at least two
1?. We discuss this literature in more detail in the next section.
1major European manufacturers in each country. The presence of high quality alternatives makes
participation in a boycott more likely.2 On the other hand, limited availability of substitutes
does not rule out the possibility of a successful boycott as long as entry is possible. Indeed,
the soft drink category saw a number of new entrants, some of which actively invoked anti-US
sentiment during their entry to the market. A prominent example is Mecca Cola, whose senior
executive's stated aim was to give the number one US corporation and the Bush administration
a \bloody nose".3
We test for the impact of the Iraq war using a dierence-in-dierence approach that compares
the evolution of sales of US products vis-a-vis non-US products during the period immediately
before and after the beginning of hostilities. Our analysis shows that sales of US soft drinks
experienced declines around the time of the Iraq war in some countries but not in others. In three
of the nine countries in our data (Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar) we nd a statistically signicant drop
in sales in the three-month period leading up to the war. In Bahrain and Qatar declines (relative
to non-US products) are also recorded during the two-month period of hostilities and the three-
month period after the end of major combat operations. In the remaining four countries there
is no evidence of a negative impact of the war on sales of US soft drinks relative to their non-US
competitors. In contrast, we nd very little evidence of a decline in the case of US detergent
sales, even though it would have been easier for consumers to nd high quality alternatives in this
case. The implication is that the disutility associated with the consumption of a stigmatized
product may be more important than the pure utility loss from not selecting one's optimal
product. We explore the issue further using survey evidence of public attitudes toward the
United States in several Arab countries. A simple cross-country analysis shows that the level of
favorable attitudes toward the United States is positively correlated with the market share of
US products in the soft drink market but not in the detergent market, which is consistent with
our ndings from the Iraq war event study.
Our results suggest that perceptions of rms and countries that are shaped by international
political developments can and do aect consumer behavior. In this particular case, the Iraq
war had a negative eect on private American rms that can be considered an additional cost of
the war that is above and beyond the perhaps unquantiable, but certainly enormous, burden
of the lives lost and damaged on both sides, the nancial cost of running the war borne by each
2The cost to consumers of participating in a boycott depends on the availability of close substitutes. The
easier it is to substitute to a similar product, the smaller the cost, and the higher the probability of a successful
boycott campaign. See ? and ?.
3\We wanted to give a bloody nose directly to the number one corporation [Coca-Cola] that represents corporate
America because corporate America represents Bush and Bush represents neo-conservatism." (Rashad Yaqoob
quoted in The Independent (London, England); Nov. 26, 2003.)
2sides' taxpayers and the damage to both physical and human capital in Iraq.4 But perhaps
surprisingly, we do nd that the additional `product-market cost' on US business interests in
soft drink and detergent markets is economically modest and short-term in character. Although
our conclusions are specic to two consumer goods markets, our results are nonetheless at least
a helpful contribution to understanding the wider picture and are perhaps even suggestive as
to that wider picture's content as to what the possible eect of the war on wider US economic
interests might be.
2 Background
Consumer boycotts and their impact on market outcomes has received considerable attention
from economists, political scientists and marketing specialists. ? denes `private politics' to
be individual or collective action that does not rely on public order (i.e. lawmaking and the
courts) through which people attempt to further their interests by imposing their will on others.
Eorts by individuals and groups to inuence the policies and practices of private rms is one
example of such behavior and consumer boycotts are an important tool that is frequently used
to that end. Well-known examples include several campaigns against Nike for labor practices
in its Asian factories5 and against Exxon Mobil for its environmental record.6 Boycotts can
also involve government, both as targets and as instigators of boycotts. Several US cities have
announced boycotts against the state of Arizona because of its tough new immigration law.7
There is a great deal of both policy and academic debate about the eectiveness of boycotts.
Economists are generally skeptical because of the free-rider element involved in boycott partici-
pation; a consumer may very well prefer that a rm changes a certain practice if this comes at no
cost to him, but he may not be willing to participate in a boycott that would limit his choices.
There is surprisingly little formal theoretical analysis of boycotts, some recent exceptions being
?, ? and ?. Empirical research is also limited and its ndings are \sketchy and inconclusive" (?).
Some recent work has focused on the boycott campaign undertaken in the US against French
wines as a reaction to French opposition to the Iraq war. ? found evidence of a 13% drop in
4? provide an estimate of these costs.
5A web search for \boycott nike" yields dozens of dierent calls for boycotts. The site http://www.viet.net/
~nike/ by Vietnam Labor Watch is a good starting point.
6\Environmental Groups Launch Exxon Boycott," National Public Radio, July 12, 2005 [http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4749052].
7\In Wake of Immigration Law, Calls for an Economic Boycott of Arizona," The New York Times, April
26, 2010; \L.A. Becomes Largest City To Boycott Arizona," CBS, May 12, 2010 [http://cbs2.com/local/Los.
Angeles.City.2.1689109.html].
3French wine sales in the US over the six-month period surrounding the beginning of hostilities.
They attributed this decline to the boycott campaigns. ? have disputed this conclusion claiming
that the observed decline was part of a general downward trend in the sales of French wines and
was unrelated to the Iraq war. In a broader analysis, ? nd that strained relations between
US and France led to a reduction in bilateral trade by a remarkable 10-12%. They also nd
that much of this reduction was due to reduced trade in rms' inputs. In another case study,
? nd that Chinese boycotts of French products in 2008 led at 25-33% drop in sales of French
automobiles.
The international aspect of many of these boycott campaigns brings an interesting dimension
to the issue. Are boycotts more eective when an element of patriotism is involved? This
question is relevant in foreign policy circles, where experts are interested in the economic impact
of US foreign policy on the US itself. One particular debate is over the use of sanctions, which
some experts consider to be ineective but also costly to the US economy (??). In one particular
study that utilizes a gravity model framework, ? estimate that in 1995 alone the United States
lost $15 to $19 billion worth of exports to countries that were the target of sanctions. In a
related study, ? nd that foreign diplomats living in New York City are more likely to break the
law (by parking illegally) if they come from a country with negative attitudes toward the US.
It seems plausible that military interventions could have a similar negative impact as sanc-
tions { both types of intervention may be hugely unpopular with at least some subsets of
consumers. There is no question that the Iraq war stirred anti-American sentiments across the
globe and particularly in the Arab world.8 Numerous boycott campaigns were organized by
individuals and civic groups in many Arab countries. Organizers of such campaigns often pro-
vided consumers with lists of European and Asian products they could use as substitutes for
US products. Language barriers and distance, both physically and in time, make the collection
of quantitative evidence about the number and scale of these boycotts dicult. Nonetheless,
we were able to obtain an example of the kind of list that circulated in Saudi Arabia. The
list includes a wide range of products and services from US providers: personal hygiene and
cleaning supplies, food items and restaurants, clothing, electronics, vehicles and furniture. For
each product category the list includes the name of the American brands and a list of substitute
products that are of European or Asian origin.9 Reports of a number of specic boycotts have
also appeared in the international press. For example, the UK's The Guardian newspaper pub-
lished a story on January 8, 2003 naming McDonald's, Burger King, Tide and Ariel detergents,
8Some survey evidence is presented in section 5.
9Our source has asked us not to publish the actual list.
4Pampers, Coca-Cola and Pepsi as some of the targets of an Arab boycott.10 By March 2004,
a Coca-Cola director is reported in the Khaleej Times as saying \Coca-Cola is looking at a
double-digit growth despite tough international and regional competition. And we feel this is
achievable as we can see signals of favorable market conditions returning with external factors
disappearing."11 The report claims that \some US companies have reported a drop in sales of
between 25 and 40%" and goes on to argue that \factories in Iran making Zam Zam Cola are
struggling to keep up with demand for their sweeter version of Pepsi and Coca-Cola. In the
United Arab Emirates, sales of the local Star Cola have soared." AME Info, a provider of online
business information in and about the Middle East, reported in April 2004 that \in Bahrain, the
Al-Montazah supermarket chain [...] boosted sales by pulling about 1,000 US products o its
shelves, and other grocers followed suit."12 Our data can be used to evaluate such statements,
some of which contradict each other.
3 Data
Our data were kindly provided by Nielsen, the well-known marketing company specializing in
consumer goods. We observe prices, sales and distribution of the signicant brands in each
product category in nine Arab countries (Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE). The periodicity is monthly for soft drinks and bimonthly for
detergents and the period covered varies across countries, as seen in Table 1. Full details of each
of the samples used in the analysis are provided in appendix A.
A total of 25 brands of soft drinks appear in our data.13 Fourteen of those are US brands
distributed by the Coca Cola (CCI) and Pepsi Cola (PCI) corporations. In addition, there were
categories \Other PCI brands" and \Other CCI brands" reported in the data. We dropped
these other brands from the study as their sales were trivial.14 There is also one major European
distributor, Cadbury-Schweppes. The major regional producer is Al-ahram Beverages Company
(ABC) which is originally an Egyptian rm that was taken over by Heineken (a European rm)
in September 2002. ABC was the state monopoly prior to 1997 but was subsequently privatized.
10\Arab boycott of American consumer goods spreads," The Guardian, January 8, 2003.
11Gurtay Kipcak, Public Aairs and Communications Director, Eurasia and Middle East Division of Coca-Cola,
cited in \Coca-Cola launches new drink in UAE," Khaleej Times, March 24, 2004.
12\Coke and Pepsi battle it out," http://www.ameinfo.com/37492.html, April 8, 2004.
13Table 10 in appendix A reports all the brands, together with their country of origin.
14Average (across periods and countries) sales of \other CCI brands" were 0.28 thousand 8oz bottles while
average sales of other PCI brands were 0.01 thousand 8oz bottles. These compare to average sales of CCI's
agship Coca Cola brand of 467 thousand 8oz bottles.
5Table 1: Period covered by data for each country and product
Country Soft Drinks Detergents
Bahrain Jan. 2002 - Dec. 2005 Jan/Feb 2002 - Jan/Feb 2005
Egypt Jan. 2002 - Mar. 2005 Jan/Feb 2002 - May/Jun 2004
Jordan Jan. 2002 - Dec. 2005 Jan/Feb 2002 - Mar/Apr 2005
Kuwait Jan. 2002 - Dec. 2005 Jan/Feb 2002 - Jan/Feb 2005
Lebanon Jan. 2001 - Jun. 2006 Jan/Feb 2002 - Nov/Dec 2005
Oman Jan. 2001 - Jul. 2006 Jan/Feb 2002 - Jan/Feb 2005
Qatar Jan. 2002 - Dec. 2005 Jan/Feb 2002 - Jan/Feb 2005
S. Arabia Jan. 2002 - Jun. 2005 Jan/Feb 2002 - Nov/Dec 2005
UAE Jan. 2002 - Dec. 2005 Jan/Feb 2002 - Jul/Aug 2005
Note: major hostilities in Iraq took place in March-April 2003.
ABC's brands mainly have a presence in Egypt with the exception of Everness, which also sells
in Oman, Qatar and the UAE. Table 2 provides summary statistics for soft drinks. Saudi
Arabia is by far the biggest market, more than twice as big as second-ranked Egypt. Prices are
not comparable across countries because they are denoted in local currencies. The distribution
variable measures the percentage of outlets (weighted by sales) carrying each brand.
Table 2: Summary statistics for soft drinks by country
Weighted
Quantity Price distribution
Country Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Bahrain 69.1 120 247.7 120.3 61.8 36.3
Egypt 571.4 801.5 3.0 1.6 32.5 34.3
Jordan 220.8 354.4 0.5 0.3 47.6 36.2
Kuwait 246.8 406.3 0.2 0.1 65.1 34.5
Lebanon 231.2 346.2 1,275.3 639.5 50.3 35.7
Oman 119.1 178.1 206 106.2 69.6 38.9
Qatar 56.9 98.1 2.8 2.0 62.9 39.7
S. Arabia 1,222.3 1,828.4 2.8 1.4 64.4 34
UAE 254.2 425.7 239.2 123.8 62.1 39.2
Note: averages are taken across brands and time-periods and prices are measured in local
currency units. Quantities are measured in thousands of 8oz containers.
A limitation of the dataset is that it lumps sales of all small brands together in an \Others"
category and as a result we cannot track the success of individual small brands that were
launched to take advantage of the boycott. Mecca Cola appears in the Nielsen data we use only
in Qatar in 2003-2005. It also launched in France in November 2002 and in Britain in January
62004.15 A second entrant, Arabian Cola, appears in the data only in Oman for the period
2002m8 to 2003m1 during which it records an unimpressive total sales volume of 1,500 8-oz
bottle equivalents. A third entrant, Qibla Cola, does not appear in the data but was launched
in the UK in 2003 and has subsequently entered a number of territories around the world, selling
to countries including UK, Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Libya, Pakistan from April 2004 and
Malaysia from March 2005.16
The fabric detergent market is less concentrated than the soft drinks market and features a
number of small local brands and manufacturers.17 There are two major American manufactur-
ers, P&G and Colgate. The rst is the market leader in almost all the countries in our dataset.
Its two main competitors are the European manufacturers Unilever and Henkel. There are also
a considerable number of local manufacturers, some of whom operate in more than one country.
Another characteristic of our detergents sample is the varying number of brands found in each
country. Table 3 provides summary statistics for each country. Egypt has the largest sales of
detergents while Saudi Arabia has the largest sales in our soft drinks dataset.
Table 3: Summary statistics for detergents by country
Weighted
Quantity Price distribution
Country Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Bahrain 29.1 54.8 675.1 418.6 43.9 33.5
Egypt 2,613.7 3,619.9 4.6 2.9 33.5 28.1
Jordan 182.7 320.3 1.3 0.9 42.6 34.9
Kuwait 10 15.5 7.2 4.3 49.0 39.2
Lebanon 9.6 19.9 36,430.8 36,893.8 29.3 34.5
Oman 4.4 8.3 15241.8 49,787.2 38.5 34.2
Qatar 2.6 3.5 114.6 270.1 55.4 39.0
S. Arabia 774.3 1,398.7 5.9 2.8 47.4 35.0
UAE 9.3 20.0 18,784.5 44,890.1 31.8 36.1
Note: averages are taken across brands and time-periods and prices are measured in local
currency units. Quantities are measured in thousands of kilograms.
15\Goodbye, Coke. Hello, Mecca Cola," The Washington Post, April 20, 2003.
16The company went into receivership in the UK in September 2005. Wikipedia reports that it continues
to operate in some countries but we have been unable to conrm this. Records from the Internet Archive
(http://www.archive.org) indicate that the company's website (http://www.qibla-cola.com) was live until
2008.
17A list of all brands in the data is provided in Table 11 in appendix A.
74 Empirical analysis
This section presents the evidence on the impact of the Iraq war on sales of US soft drinks and
detergents in the nine Arab countries in our data. We rst present descriptive and graphical
evidence and then move to a more formal econometric analysis.
4.1 Descriptive evidence
Major combat operations in Iraq began in March 2003 and ceased in May 2003. If there was an
impact on sales of US products, we would expect it to show up in annual sales gures for the
year 2003. Table 4 reports growth rates of sales of US and non-US products in each country over
several dierent periods. Annual sales of US products declined in 2003 relative to the previous
year in ve of the nine countries in our sample. On the other hand, sales of non-US products
increased in all nine countries. In 2003, the (unweighted) average growth over all countries
was 2.1% for US products and 23.3% for non-US products. By contrast, in 2004 and 2005 the
sales growth of US products was somewhat higher than that of non-US products in almost all
countries. Note however that these growth rates are relative to the low sales levels of 2003.
During the two-year period 2002-2004, sales of non-US products grew much faster than those of
US products in seven out of nine countries. The overall picture emerging from Table 4 is that
sales of US products were negatively impacted in 2003 but returned to \normal" growth rates
in 2004. We cannot of course say from this table alone whether sales eventually return to the
levels they would have attained in the counterfactual world of no war.
For a more detailed look at the temporal evolution of sales we turn to a graphical depiction
of the data. Figure 1 plots 12-month growth rates of monthly sales of US and non-US soft
drink products; that is, it compares sales in each month to sales of the same month the previous
year. This is dierent from the growth rates reported in Table 4, which measure the growth of
annual sales. Focusing on monthly 12-month growth rates means that we are able to make a
comparison between the same month in dierent years, the simplest and most transparent way
of controlling for seasonality. The vertical line on each plot marks the beginning of hostilities
in Iraq (March 2003). It can be seen that the sales growth rate of US products at the time of
the war is slower than that of non-US products in every single country and is in fact negative
in all but one of them. The exception is Kuwait, where sales of US products grow consistently
throughout 2002-03. Sales of US soft drinks begin showing positive growth rates in almost all
countries sometime in the post-war period. Comparing the sales growth of US and non-US
products, there is generally a divergence in the rate of growth during hostilities followed by
8Table 4: Sales growth rates of soft drinks
Growth rates in yearly sales between:
2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2002-2004 2002-2005
US products
Bahrain -7.9 15.3 7.2 6.2 13.9
Egypt 10.9 4.0 15.3
Jordan -8.1 20.3 23.2 10.6 36.2
Kuwait 19.7 6.6 18.8 27.5 51.6
Lebanon 0.8 4.6 -0.5 5.5 5.0
Oman -5.3 15.0 7.6 8.9 17.1
Qatar 12.1 26.1 29.8 41.4 83.6
S. Arabia -2.2 7.4 5.0
UAE -1.6 25.6 6.0 23.6 31.1
Mean 2.1 13.9 13.2 16.0 34.1
Non-US products
Bahrain 6.0 -3.8 6.6 1.9 8.7
Egypt 11.0 -4.3 6.2
Jordan 62.8 32.6 18.0 115.9 154.9
Kuwait 43.1 14.2 15.3 63.4 88.3
Lebanon 12.1 5.7 1.7 18.5 20.5
Oman 16.3 13.2 2.7 31.6 35.2
Qatar 37.7 33.5 19.1 83.9 119.0
S. Arabia 11.4 2.7 14.3
UAE 9.3 27.1 -3.1 38.9 34.6
Mean 23.3 13.4 8.6 41.6 65.9
a gradual convergence in the post-war period. Overall, we see Figure 1 as providing strong
evidence that the war had a negative impact on US sales and a positive impact on non-US sales,
but that the eect was short-lived.
We repeat the descriptive analysis for the fabric detergent product category. Table 5 reports
annual growth rates and paints a very dierent picture than the case of soft drinks. Growth
rates for US products were positive in 2003 in all countries except Kuwait, where it was slightly
negative. By contrast, non-US products experienced negative growth in three countries. US
products do even better in 2004, when they grow by an average rate of 5.6% whereas non-US
products lose 2.7% of sales. Between 2002 and 2004, US product sales grow faster in six of
the eight countries for which growth rates can be calculated. Overall, there is no evidence of a








































Figure 1: Percentage change in sales of US and non-US soft drinks in each month compared to
the same month the previous year. In the case of Jordan percentage changes exceeding 100%
were marked as 100% in order to keep the scale reasonable. The vertical line denotes the start
of hostilities in Iraq.
eective one would have to argue that US products' superior performance in 2004 (relative to
non-US products) indicates that sales in 2003 might have grown even faster were it not for the
war. Such a position is quite dicult to reconcile with (for example) almost 20% growth rates
in US sales in 2002/03 in Lebanon and Oman.
Figure 2 is the equivalent of Figure 1 for detergent products. It plots growth rates for each
two-month period relative to the same period one year earlier (\MA2003" stands for March-
April 2003). Sales of US products grew faster than those of non-US products around the time of
the war in ve out of the nine countries; these are the same countries that show higher annual
growth rates for non-US products in Table 5. In four of the ve countries (Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE) there is evidence of a reversal as growth rates of US products overtake
those of non-US products a few months after the war and remain higher thereafter. In Jordan
the growth rates of US products drop signicantly starting in January-February 2003 and start
recovering about six months after the war. The evidence is not as strong as in the case of
soft drinks, but there is enough action in the data in at least ve countries to warrant further
10Table 5: Sales growth rates of detergents
Growth rates in yearly sales between:
2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2002-2004 2002-2005
US products
Bahrain 3.5 10.4 14.3
Egypt 4.4
Jordan 2.4 9.3 11.9
Kuwait -0.9 2.6 1.7
Lebanon 18.2 -3.8 7.0 13.7 21.7
Oman 19.2 8.0 28.7
Qatar 0.4 -2.6 -2.3
Saudi Arabia 8.6 14.3 7.2 24.1 33.0
UAE 8.5 6.6 15.7
Mean 7.1 5.6 7.1 13.5 27.4
Non-US products
Bahrain -4.4 -7.7 -11.8
Egypt 6.6
Jordan -3.5 -2.8 -6.2
Kuwait 21.7 1.6 23.7
Lebanon 14.1 -1.9 0.6 11.9 12.6
Oman -6.3 -5.7 -11.6
Qatar 5.5 1.5 7.1
Saudi Arabia 13.6 -1.0 -6.3 12.5 5.4
UAE 11.5 -5.7 5.1
Mean 6.5 -2.7 -2.8 3.8 9.0
investigation.
4.2 Econometric analysis
A straightforward method for estimating the impact of the war on US sales is to implement
a dierence-in-dierence approach, using non-US sales as the \control" group. Clearly, non-
US products are not a \control" group in the standard sense since their sales may very well be
aected, probably in a positive direction, by the treatment (the war). Even so the data variation
is useful to test the hypothesis of a dierential eect on the two types of products.
Let Qjct denote the quantity (volume) of sales of brand j in country c at time (month) t.








































Figure 2: Percentage change in sales of US and non-US fabric detergents in each month compared
to the same month the previous year. The vertical line denotes the start of hostilities in Iraq.
of 2003. Recall that hostilities began on March 20th 2003 and President Bush declared the end
of major combat operations on May 1st 2003. We dene the dummy variables Prewart and
Postwart to take the value of one for the three months prior to the beginning and after the
end respectively of major combat operations. We estimate the following specication using the
natural log of sales, lnQjct, as the dependent variable:
lnQjct = jc+ct+1c (USj  PreWart)+2c (USj  Wart)+3c (USj  PostWart)+"jct (1)
where jc are xed eects for each brand-country pair, ct are country specic time xed eects,
c = (1c;2c;3c) are the country-specic coecients of interest and "jct are the error terms.
We repeat the exercise using two alternative dependent variables, log prices and log weighted
distribution (with the latter not reported). As a robustness check, we add log price to the log
sales specication to account for possible movement in sales caused by price adjustments.
In this formulation of the regression equation, the fact that we do not pool the data across
countries means that all the parameters are country specic and our estimates only use within
12country data variation. For a given country the presence of brand (country) xed eects then
means that the estimates are \within brand" in the sense that they allow for brand specic xed
eects. The estimates then use variation across brands and time (within country) to identify
(1c, 2c, 3c). The country-time xed eects control for shocks that might aect sales of all
products within each product category in the same way, such as seasonality in demand (demand
for soft drinks tends to be higher during the summer months). The coecients on the interaction
terms, US*PreWar, US*War and US*PostWar are therefore identied using within-country data
variation, controlling for brand-and-time-specic variation. They respectively capture the eect
of the war on sales of US products relative to non-US products during the PreWar, War and
PostWar periods.18
The specication in equation (1) aims to capture the dierence between sales growth rates
for US and non-US products like those reported in Tables 4 and 5 and displayed in Figures 1
and 2, although there are some dierences between them. The tables report changes in annual
sales while the gures and the econometric analysis use 12-month growth rates. The latter are
better suited for capturing short-term eects. Also, the tables and gures report changes in
aggregate (over brands) sales of US and non-US products, while the econometrics capture the
average impact on US versus non-US brands. This average may mask a dierential impact across
brands.
We estimated the model separately for each country and for each product category. The
results of estimating equation (1) for soft drinks are reported in the rst panel of Table 6, under
the heading \Sales". For brevity we display only the coecients of primary interest, namely 1c,
2c and 3c. We see evidence of a statistically signicant drop (at the 10% level or better in at
least one of the three periods we test for) in sales of US products in four of the nine countries
(Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, Qatar). In two other countries (Jordan and Lebanon) coecients are
negative and quite large but not statistically signicant. In Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
we obtain mostly positive coecients, with only one of them being statistically signicant (for
the pre-war period in the UAE).
Prices may be a confounding factor in this analysis. If prices adjusted downward in response
to a drop in demand for US products, this would tend to dampen the estimated impact on sales.
In order to test for the possible role of prices, we rst look for an impact on relative prices
by estimating a similar specication to (1), but using price instead of sales as the dependent
18An alternative approach would have been to estimate an equation that includes time xed eects that are
specic to US and non-US products and to examine how the two sets of estimates behave during the period of
interest.
13Table 6: Estimates of equations (1)-(3) for the soft drinks product category
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Table 9. Estimates of equations (1) -(3) with time fixed effects: soft drinks. 
   Sales 
        Egypt        Bahrain        Jordan      Kuwait Lebanon        Oman       Qatar   S. Arabia         UAE 
US_prewar        -0.284 *  -0.291 *  -0.494  0.354  -0.185  -0.029  -0.258 *  0.007  0.328+
                  (0.090)    (0.120)    (0.384)  (0.235)  (0.370)  (0.104)  (0.101)    (0.126)  (0.180) 
US_war            -0.258 *  -0.258 *  -0.175  0.173  -0.15  -0.108+ -0.54 *  0.091  0.131 
                  (0.098)    (0.115)    (0.404)  (0.253)  (0.455)  (0.057)  (0.166)    (0.109)  (0.249) 
US_postwar       -0.122 +  -0.204 +  0.243  0.305  -0.518  -0.509* -0.427 *  -0.003  -0.075 
                  (0.067)    (0.114)    (0.450)  (0.249)  (0.370)  (0.259)  (0.129)    (0.090)  (0.220) 
                                                  
R-squared         0.976    0.845    0.821  0.925  0.813  0.841  0.904    0.92  0.887 
N                 740    690    578  549  594  702  586    525  694 
   Price 
        Egypt        Bahrain        Jordan      Kuwait Lebanon        Oman       Qatar   S. Arabia         UAE 
US_prewar        0.045 *  -0.005    0.035  -0.021  0.186+ 0.118* 0.041 *  0.001  -0.021 
                  (0.016)    (0.012)    (0.048)  (0.022)  (0.096)  (0.041)  (0.013)    (0.022)  (0.026) 
US_war            0.061 *  -0.016    0.042  -0.009  0.145  0.101* 0.059 *  -0.004  -0.04*
                  (0.016)    (0.010)    (0.056)  (0.026)  (0.143)  (0.050)  (0.021)    (0.027)  (0.019) 
US_postwar       0.048 *  -0.031 *  0.006  -0.024  0.214+ 0.127* 0.036 *  -0.002  -0.047*
                  (0.014)    (0.009)    (0.048)  (0.024)  (0.113)  (0.046)  (0.012)    (0.020)  (0.012) 
                                                  
R-squared         0.953    0.938    0.859  0.949  0.598  0.569  0.851    0.962  0.932 
N                 740    690    579  549  594  702  586    525  694 
                                                  
   Sales, controlling for Price 
        Egypt        Bahrain        Jordan      Kuwait Lebanon        Oman       Qatar   S. Arabia         UAE 
lnp               -2.373 *  -2.843 *  -3.299* -4.736* -2.774* -3.381* -2.563 *  0.237  -1.98 
                  (0.377)    (1.103)    (0.518)  (0.661)  (0.509)  (0.651)  (0.402)    (1.056)  (1.983) 
US_prewar        -0.177 *  -0.305 *  -0.378  0.253  0.332  0.369* -0.153 +  0.007  0.286 
                  (0.089)    (0.101)    (0.389)  (0.166)  (0.266)  (0.154)  (0.081)    (0.122)  (0.196) 
US_war            -0.112    -0.303 *  -0.053  0.129  0.251  0.233  -0.39 *  0.092  0.051 
                  (0.089)    (0.105)    (0.431)  (0.160)  (0.349)  (0.175)  (0.138)    (0.106)  (0.271) 
US_postwar       -0.007    -0.291 *  0.261  0.192  0.076  -0.08  -0.336 *  -0.003  -0.168 
                  (0.065)    (0.126)    (0.409)  (0.169)  (0.348)  (0.233)  (0.120)    (0.089)  (0.248) 
                                           
R-squared         0.979    0.852    0.839  0.946  0.845  0.874  0.918    0.92  0.889 
N                 740    690    578  549  594  702  586    525  694 
                          
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05   All regressions include brand and time fixed effects and are estimated separately for each country. Robust 





lnPjct = jc +ct +1c (USj  PreWart)+2c (USj  Wart)+3c (USj  PostWart)+"jct (2)
The results are reported in the second panel of Table 6, under the heading \Price". We
only pick up a signicant drop in US prices (relative to non-US) in the UAE and to a lesser
extent in Bahrain. Interestingly, we pick up an increase in relative prices in four countries
(Egypt, Lebanon, Oman and Qatar), with the increase in Lebanon and Oman being in the
double digits in each of the three periods. One reason to expect apparent price increases would
be if relatively low-price stores sold fewer US products during the rst half of 2003. If so, then
the resulting change in composition of selling prices across stores would appear as a positive
pricing response in this regression. Given these ndings, it seems important to add controls for
prices in specication (1). We therefore re-estimated equation (1) with the addition of log price
as an explanatory variable:
lnQjct = jc+ct+ lnPjct+1c (USj  PreWart)+2c (USj  Wart)+3c (USj  PostWart)+"jct
(3)
This equation may be thought to represent a demand relationship. However we prefer not
to give it this structural interpretation primarily because we do not need to and also because it
would be a stretch to claim that we were estimating structural parameters rather than reduced
form parameters from this equation. There are at least three reasons for this: (i) changes in
observed prices may reect changes in availability of products at stores with dierent prices,
rather than actual price changes; (ii) generally we would expect the demand for any brand to at
least potentially depend on rival brand prices, which are not included in equation (2); and (iii)
prices may be correlated with the error term and thus would need to be treated as endogenous
variables;19 The results are reported in the third panel of Table 6 under the heading \Sales,
controlling for price". Relative to the estimates from equation (1) reported in the top panel,
coecients move in the expected direction. They become smaller in the case of the UAE and
Bahrain and larger in the case of Egypt, Lebanon, Oman and Qatar. The coecients on price
look entirely plausible if one were willing to interpret them as elasticities. The only substantive
change is in the case Oman where the estimated negative impact disappears, even becoming
positive and signicant in the pre-war period. In Egypt, Bahrain and Qatar we still have a
signicant negative impact in at least one of the periods we test for.
19That said, as is commonly the case with data from supermarkets where promotions provide a signicant
amount of the variation in price data, there appears little evidence of endogeneity of prices and we do indeed
estimate a relationship between quantity and price that slopes downward.
15Table 7: Estimates of equations (1)-(3) for the laundry detergents product category
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Table 10.  Estimates of equations (1)-(3) with time fixed effects: detergents.   
   Sales 
        Egypt        Bahrain         Jordan      Kuwait     Lebanon        Oman       Qatar    S. Arabia  UAE 
US_prewar      0.085    -0.161    0.169  -0.249  -0.085  0.269  -0.714    -0.131  -0.89*
                  (0.089)    (0.383)    (0.529)  (0.269)  (0.533)  (0.346)  (0.476)    (0.387)  (0.326) 
US_war            0.38    -1.362    -0.541  -1.814  0.276  -0.423  -0.077    -0.427  -0.786 
                  (0.318)    (1.412)    (0.555)  (1.333)  (0.582)  (0.736)  (0.493)    (0.265)  (0.644) 
US_postwar     -0.228    -0.461 +  -0.551+ -0.044  0.261  0.211  0.199    -0.289  -0.553*
                  (0.202)    (0.259)    (0.297)  (0.264)  (0.463)  (0.230)  (0.255)    (0.195)  (0.275) 
                                                 
R-squared        0.976    0.82    0.772  0.932  0.86  0.93  0.937    0.946  0.939 
N                 144    295    239  269  477  374  239    324  495 
   Price 
        Egypt        Bahrain         Jordan      Kuwait     Lebanon        Oman       Qatar    S. Arabia  UAE
US_prewar      -0.025    0.051    0.206* 0.146* 0.089  0.079* 0.146 *  0.073* 0.049 
                  (0.015)    (0.039)    (0.097)  (0.049)  (0.060)  (0.034)  (0.067)    (0.014)  (0.076) 
US_war            -0.019    0.1    0.253+ 0.128* 0.137  0.066  -0.102    0.058* -0.242 
                  (0.018)    (0.066)    (0.146)  (0.048)  (0.088)  (0.040)  (0.211)    (0.022)  (0.332) 
US_postwar     -0.013    0.07 +  0.279+ 0.087* 0.128+ 0.065+ -0.123    0.023  -0.166 
                  (0.017)    (0.041)    (0.152)  (0.039)  (0.073)  (0.033)  (0.121)    (0.016)  (0.156) 
                                                 
R-squared        0.985    0.839    0.641  0.919  0.706  0.965  0.845    0.965  0.886 
N                 144    295    239  269  479  378  240    324  495 
                                                 
   Sales, controlling for Price 
        Egypt        Bahrain         Jordan      Kuwait     Lebanon        Oman       Qatar   S. Arabia  UAE
lnp               -0.695    -2.202 *  -1.911* 0.029  -0.709* -1.424* -1.953 *  -2.397+ -1.153*
                  (1.224)    (0.557)    (0.296)  (0.405)  (0.265)  (0.283)  (0.514)    (1.248)  (0.189) 
US_prewar      0.068    -0.05    0.564  -0.253  -0.022  0.397  -0.429    0.045  -0.834 
                  (0.104)    (0.366)    (0.566)  (0.274)  (0.514)  (0.324)  (0.387)    (0.377)  (0.340) 
US_war            0.367    -1.141    -0.058  -1.818  0.374  -0.302  -0.277    -0.289  -1.065 
                  (0.331)    (1.324)    (0.478)  (1.346)  (0.549)  (0.723)  (0.481)    (0.256)  (0.519) 
US_postwar     -0.237    -0.306    -0.019  -0.047  0.352  0.319  -0.041    -0.232  -0.744 
                  (0.208)    (0.259)    (0.282)  (0.264)  (0.433)  (0.222)  (0.244)    (0.192)  (0.258) 
                                           
R-squared        0.976    0.836    0.799  0.932  0.864  0.933  0.956    0.947  0.947 
N                 144    295    239  269  477  372  239    324  495 
                           
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05   All regressions include brand and time fixed effects and are estimated separately for each country. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
16The econometric exercise was repeated for the case of detergent products. As we argued in
the introduction, detergents provide an interesting complement to the soft drink study because
in addition to the one large US producer, P&G, there are two large European rms, Henkel and
Unilever, with a signicant presence in each of the countries in our study. In addition there are
a number of smaller but still sizable other rms. A campaign to boycott US products might
reasonably expect to be successful in the detergents category because the cost of switching to
alternative products is likely to be small.20 Since our detergent data are bimonthly, we dene
Prewart as JF2003 and Postwart as MJ2003. The estimates presented in Table 7 show very
weak evidence of a drop in sales of US goods. In the top panel we see a signicant impact in the
UAE in the pre-war and post-war period an in Bahrain and Jordan in the post-war period. But
even these coecients become statistically insignicant once we control for prices in the bottom
panel. We conclude that there is no evidence of an impact of the war on sales of US detergents,
but with the caveat that this conclusion is based on a sparser dataset than the corresponding
one for soft drinks.
The evidence presented in this section suggests that the Iraq war had a negative impact
on the sales of some US products but the impact was by no means universal. The descriptive
and graphical evidence indicate a negative impact on soft drinks sales in almost all countries,
but formal econometric analysis picks up statistically signicant dierential eects in only three
countries: Bahrain, Egypt and Qatar. In the case of detergents the descriptive evidence is
weaker and no statistically signicant eects are found. An interesting aspect of these results
is that consumer boycotts appear to have been more eective in the market where there are
fewer branded alternatives (soft drinks). This is likely to be due to the status of brands such
as Coke and Pepsi as iconic American products. Our estimates are consistent with media
reports suggesting that the Iraq war hurt American companies but that the impact was relatively
limited.21 They also in line with other recent work showing that international politics can
inuence consumer behavior. It should be noted, however, that the impact of political events in
our study is qualitatively much smaller than the estimates reported in some other studies.22
An instructive contrast can be made with the case of the boycott of Danish products after
the publication of cartoons that were considered oensive to Muslims in a Danish newspaper
in 2005. The boycott attracted signicant retailer participation. From January to early April
20On the other hand, it may be hard for others to observe individuals cheating and so informal mechanisms to
monitor compliance are harder to use in order to avoid individuals free riding.
21One such report states: \Still, damage from last year's invasion of Iraq could have been worse, says Carline
Levy, UBS's beverage analyst in New York. `We thought there would be a big backlash," she says. "It's been
less negative than anyone worried,'" from \Coke and Pepsi battle it out," AMEInfo, April 8, 2004 [http://www.
ameinfo.com/37492.html].
22See, for example, ? and ?.
17Table 8: Opinions of America in the Arab world
Zogby International PewResearchCenter
Country 2002 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005
Saudi Arabia 12 4 9
Jordan 34 15 33 25 1 5 21
Lebanon 26 20 32 35 27 42
UAE 11 14 21
Egypt 15 2 14
Morocco 38 11 34 27 27
Source: ?? and ?. The numbers reported are the percentages of those surveyed who
stated that they hold a favorable view of the US. Our market dataset does not cover
Morocco but we included it in the table as it is an Arab country.
of 2006 several major retailers withdraw Danish dairy products from their shelves. As a result,
sales of these products during that period \came to a standstill".23 We found no evidence of
similar retailer activism in relation to the Iraq war and this might explain the limited impact of
boycott campaigns in our case study.
5 The impact of attitudes
Next we explore whether cross-country variation in attitudes toward the US is consistent with
our ndings in the previous section. Survey evidence suggests that attitudes toward the United
States in Arab countries worsened in the run-up to, and following, the Iraq war. Table 8 reports
the ndings of surveys carried out by Zogby International and the PewResearchCenter during
the 2002-2005 period covered by our data. The proportion of people with positive opinions of
the US dropped substantially between 2002 and 2004 in ve of the six countries (UAE is the
exception), but that trend exhibits a notable reversal in most countries in 2005.
We would like to relate these attitudinal variables to sales of US goods. A natural approach
would be to incorporate the attitudinal variables into the empirical specication we employed in
the previous section. This is not possible as surveys are only available yearly and our empirical
model incorporates a full set of country-specic time dummy variables. If monthly opinion
survey data by country were available, we could - for example - directly explore the relationship
between the country-time specic xed eects estimated in the model above and the attitudinal
variables. Since this is not possible { and while recognizing the limitations of our data { we
23Quote from an executive of the Danish dairy group Arla Foods, reported in \Arla dairy sales crippled
by Middle East boycott," Dairy Reporter, January 31, 2006 [http://www.dairyreporter.com/Financial/
Arla-dairy-sales-crippled-by-Middle-East-boycott].
18specify a simple model of the annual share of US products in a given country as a function of
two variables: the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita (INCOME) and the percentage of
people in the country with a favorable opinion of the US (FAVORABLE). We assume that the
opinions recorded in surveys are representative of the entire year, even though the surveys were
conducted over a much shorter period (no more than a month). Doing so gives us observations
for two years in ve countries. We supplement the Zogby international data with additional
survey evidence from the Pew Global Attitudes Project which was conducted in 2003 and 2005
(?). The Pew data reports the extent of favorable opinion about the US in two of the countries in
our study, Jordan and Lebanon. Incorporating this information gives us four more observations
on soft drinks and two on detergents (for detergents our sample does not extend to 2005) for a




ct =  +   INCOMEct +   FAV ORABLEct + "ct: (4)
The model was estimated using OLS with standard errors computed allowing for correlation
among the error terms of observations belonging to the same country. The results are presented
in Table 9. Even with only 15 observations, the coecient  is estimated quite precisely (p-
value = .061) and has the expected positive sign in the case of soft drinks. Per capita income
is also positive as one might have expected and signicant at the 5% level. The results suggest
that a 10% drop in the percentage of favorable opinions toward the US would lead to a .0258
percentage point drop in the share of US sales in total, which is equivalent to $43.3 million
of foregone annual revenue. This amount is small, at least when compared to the $1.7 billion
annual revenue from soft drinks by US corporations in this region. Note that this is only true in
the soft drink market. In the case of detergents the coecient  is imprecisely estimated, even
though the coecient  is. This is consistent with results from the previous section that showed
no impact of the Iraq war on US detergent sales even though soft drinks were aected.
6 Conclusions
The cost of the Iraq war has been a cause of much debate in the United States, partly because
measuring its full economic cost is tremendously dicult. It is however widely recognized that
a calculation of the full economic cost of the war should include a measure of foregone prots
for US companies that result from worsening attitudes toward the United States. Our study
provides evidence on the magnitude of these costs by analyzing the impact of the Iraq war on
19Table 9: Estimates of equation (4).
Soft drinks Detergents
INCOME .023 (.009) .128y (.055)
FAVORABLE .258y (.125) .457 (.354)
INTERCEPT .870 (.027) .206 (.130)
R2 .288 .238
N 15 10
 p < 0:10,
y p < 0:05. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses.
sales of US soft drink and detergent products in Arab countries. We nd a statistically signicant
but economically modest and short-lived negative impact of the war on sales of US soft drinks
in some countries, and no discernible impact on the sales of detergents in any country. Similarly,
variation in aggregate market shares of US products across countries correlates with consumer
attitudes toward the US in the soft drink market but not in the detergent market. Overall, our
estimates suggest that, at least in the two important consumer goods markets we examine, the
element of cost from this source is a small proportion of the total costs of the war.
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21APPENDIX
A Data description
The datasets utilized in the analysis were provided by the retail measurement services division
for fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) of the Nielsen company. They refer to the carbonated
soft drinks and fabric detergents categories in nine Arab countries: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA), United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and
Bahrain. Nielsen employs a stratied national sample of stores in each country in order to collect
information for a number of FMGC categories with weekly, monthly or bi-monthly frequency
depending on the product category. For the carbonated soft drinks product category information
is collected with monthly frequency while for the fabric detergents category the frequency is bi-
monthly.
The sample size and the statistical precision of estimates in each country are dened based on
nationwide retail census information performed by the company and the Nielsen global statistical
standards. The sample of stores covers all the channels (store types) through which the product
category tracked is moving and stratication takes place at the regional and channel level (double
level stratication) splitting the national sample into non-overlapping groups (stratums).
In all countries, for the top end of the trade (Hypermarkets, Supermarkets) as well as for
specic channels organized into chains (i.e. Kiosks), the data collection refers to electronic
weekly scanning data supplied by the chain stores. In the rest of the channels, data collection is
performed through store audits by professional auditors. Primary data collection is performed at
the Stock Keeping Unit (SKU) level. Brand level scores and measurements are derived through
contemporaneous aggregation of the SKU level data.
The datasets utilized in the analysis include information about all the brands in the market
summing up to the total category sales in each case. For each brand considered the available
data referred to the variables, sales volume (in 1000s 8oz cases for carbonated soft drinks and kgs
for detergents), average weighted price per unit in the local currency of each country, numeric
handling distribution and weighted handling distribution. As with the soft drinks data, deter-
gent prices are not comparable across countries because there are denoted in local currencies.
The respective brand weighted average prices were derived as a weighted average across all the
relevant SKU prices with the sales of each SKU serving as a weight. Numeric handling distribu-
tion refers to the percentage number of stores in the country handling any of SKUs belonging
22Table 10: Soft drink brands and number of countries where each is sold
Pepsi Cola Intl (USA) Coca Cola Intl (USA)
EVERVESS 4 COCA COLA 9
LIPTON ICE TEA 7 CRUSH 5
MIRINDA 9 FANTA 9
MOUNTAIN DEW 9 KREST 1
PEPSI 9 LIMCA 3
SHANI 8 QUWAT JABAL 5
TEEM 3 SPRITE 9
Cadbury-Schweppes (UK) Al-ahram Beverages (Egypt)
7-UP 9 BIRELL 1
CANADA DRY 1 CETRINO 1
ROYAL CROWN 2 FAYROUZ 1
SCHWEPPES 8 YOUSFINO 1
SPORT COLA 2
Ugarit (Syria)
Mecca Cola (UAE) UGARIT 1
MECCA COLA 1
to the brand while weighted distribution refers to the percentage sales volume of the category
moving through the stores handling each brand.
23Table 11: Detergent brands and number of countries where each is sold
Unilever (UK) National Detergents Co. (Oman)
OMO 9 BAHAR 4
SURF 8 NO1 3
BONA 1 AYAM 1
SURF 1 SUR 1
CORAL LQD 5 PRINO 1
SUNLIGHT 5 SITE 2
LUX 5
SKIP 1 Reckitt Benckiser (UK)
SUPER 1 VANISH 1
RIN 1 WOOLITE 3
WISK 1
ALL 1 Colgate (USA)
AXION 1
Henkel (Germany) GAMA 1
DAC 7
PERSIL 9 Al Ahilia Detergent Co. (Oman)
DIXAN 9 IDEAL 1
X-TRA 4 WADI 1
LE CHAT 2 BELLA 1
WIPP 1 SANA 2
PERWOLL 1
NICE 1 Daaboul (Syria)
MIR 1 MADAR 1
PAK 1 MOUDHISH 1
ABAYA 1
CHEK 1 Qatar Detergents Company (Qatar)
MICOLOR 1 PEARL 1
P&G (USA) ICA (Jordan)
TIDE 9 SUPER WHITE 1
ARIEL 9 ORYX 1
DAZ 5 WONDER WHITE 1
CHEER 6 NEON 1
BONUX 7
LANG 1 Ditra-Sitra (UAE)
FAIRY 4 TAJ 2
DASH 1 AL NOUJOUOM 1
YES 1 ZAHRA 2
BOLD 3
FA 1 FAX (Turkey)
IVORY 1 Evyap 1
MR. CLEAN 1
24